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Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the
Middle East and Turkey
NI˙L S. SATANA
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University
ABSTRACT This article seeks to understand the transformation of Turkish civil-military
relations in a comparative perspective. The analysis is based on two criteria: institutional/
legal mechanisms and political oversight of the military’s autonomy. Comparison of European
and Middle Eastern civil-military relations models to the Turkish paradigm unveils grave
differences between Turkish and Middle Eastern civil-military relations. The Turkish model
in transformation for at least a decade is closer to the European model in both legal and
political aspects. Nevertheless, the article underscores that Turkish civil-military relations
are still in transformation and although the EU accession process has gradually democratized
the legal system of the country, democratic consolidation requires further advances in the
political domain. Consequently, consolidation in Turkey depends not only on retreating of
the military from the political realm but also on the proper civilianization of the regime in
theory and practice.
Introduction
In 1993, long before the latest debates on the shift of Turkey’s axis in foreign policy-
making, Graham Fuller depicted Turkey’s general orientation as Eastern and not
Western.1 Later, in 2005, as a presidential candidate of France, Nicolas Sarkozy
compared Turkey with Lebanon and asserted that Lebanon owns more European
values than Turkey. Sarkozy described Turkey as an “Asian country,” and objected
to Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU).2 On the contrary, former German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair did not
question Turkey’s “Europeanness” and instead supported Turkey’s bid for the EU
membership.
Likewise, several Western scholars have had contrasting perceptions of Turkey,
classifying the country as an authoritarian state in the Middle East. For example,
Tim Jacoby has argued that Turkey’s regime structure has been far from democratic
since Turkey has adopted a semi-authoritarian incorporation strategy in the 1960s and
1970s while an autocratic militarism followed as a state strategy after the 1980 coup.3
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In his 2003 article, Jacoby has pointed to the longevity of military involvement in
Middle Eastern politics by using Turkey as a case in point. Jacoby has not referred
to any positive transformations taking place in the last couple of decades in civil-
military relations in Turkey. Along the same lines, Linda Michaud-Emin examined
the effect of the EU harmonization packages on Turkish civil-military relations
(CMR) and she found little change in Turkish civil-military relations even after the
recent reforms. Thus, according to her, inefficiency and instability of the Turkish
political system lingers on.4
In a comparative study, Steven Cook situates Turkish CMR in the Middle Eastern
civil-military relations paradigm, arguing while “Turks often chafe at the suggestion,
the processes and patterns that characterized the Turkish political system until the
early 2000s resembled those in Egypt and Algeria.”5 Cook compares three predomi-
nantly Muslim countries, Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, to examine how institutional
settings under the legacy of military domination lead to the endurance of authoritar-
ianism in the Middle East. In essence, Cook tries to figure out how the military
achieves ruling without having to govern. In sum, since all three cases are portrayed
as authoritarian states with strong militaries, Cook does not find the comparison of
Turkey, Egypt and Algeria within the same framework problematic.6
While comparisons of the Turkish CMR to the Middle Eastern paradigm are
scarce, studies that compare the Turkish case to the European norms and standards
are abundant. Although most studies on Turkish civil-military relations have used
the single case study method to advance theoretical or empirical arguments for
explaining the political power of the Turkish military,7 comparative studies of
Turkish CMR have considered Turkey among democracies such as those of the
EU members and Israel.8 Anthony Forster, for example, includes Turkey in his com-
parative study of armed forces in Europe as a country that is gradually transforming
its CMR for the EU membership.9 Along the same lines, O¨zkan and Tsarouhas high-
light the importance of the EU accession process in the civilianization of Greece and
point to the possible impacts of the EU accession process on further democratization
of Turkey.10 Karabelias in turn includes Turkey in a comparison of southeastern
European countries together with Albania and Greece in terms of the size of the
military, its ideology, political culture/institutions and external factors.11 Karabelias
suggests that each country follows its own path to achieve liberal democratic stan-
dards so that they can become members of the EU. Turkey, according to Karabelias,
is fortunate since its political culture and leadership were already transforming,
even before the pressure of the EU has led to several additional reforms to
enhance Turkey’s democratization.12
Others too highlight the importance of reforms leading to the evolution of the CMR
in Turkey in a liberal direction. For example, Cizre13 and Misrahi14 point to the sig-
nificance of change in the nature of Turkish civil-military relations in the last few
decades. Narlı’s work also places Turkey in the southern European military culture
and underscores the evolution of civil-military relations in the country.15
Still other studies compare the Turkish military to Latin American militaries. Some
of those studies also see the CMR in Turkey moving toward the liberal model. In their
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work that compares Turkey with Latin America in terms of democratic consolidation
and transformation of their militaries, Heper and Gu¨ney emphasize the progress in
Turkish CMR.16 David Pion-Berlin in this volume makes a similar assessment.17
This article compares the Turkish civil-military relations to the Western European,
Eastern European, and Middle Eastern CMR. In each case, the analysis is based on
political and legal aspects of civil-military relations.
Western European versus Turkish Civil-Military Relations18
Most scholars underline the absence of a unified and formal European framework of
civil-military relations and, rather, point to the best practices.19 As Volten and Drent
posit, “there is no such thing as one single European practice.”20 Democracy in Euro-
pean states is built on several different formal and informal rules with each state
gradually developing its own system of democratic supervision over the military.
Although there are concerns about whether the development of a European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) will jeopardize civilian control of security policies in the
EU,21 it has been concluded that member states manage to “balance between civilian
direction and . . . recognition of military professionalism in their diverse defense
policies.”22
Here the differences and similarities between the Turkish CMR and the Western
European model will be taken up in terms of two interrelated criteria: legal/
institutional mechanisms and political oversight of the military’s autonomy.23 In
the European paradigm, different legal and institutional mechanisms lead to different
practices in CMR. For example, in most European states, the role of the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces is assigned to the head of the state or the government.24
However, in Germany, the Commander in Chief is the Federal Minister of Defense
and not the Prime Minister.25 However, the duties, rights and responsibilities of
both the civilians and the military are ascertained in Western Europe in a liberal
direction and both sides conform to them.
Another significant legal/institutional aspect of civil-military relations in Europe is
related to the presence of an integrated Ministry of Defense, which supervises the
Office of the General Staff and holds that office responsible to the Minister of
Defense that in turn is responsible to the government for “the management of the
armed forces, formulation and conduct of defense policies, and territorial defense
of the country, as well as development of long-term political-military goals.”26 It is
true that in different European countries, the Chief of the General Staff is responsible
to the Prime Minister, President or the Minister of Defense depending on the insti-
tutional structure of the state determined by each state’s needs and past experiences.
Nevertheless, in all cases the Chief of the General Staff is legally and institutionally
bound to civilian authorities and they act in that manner.
The second criterion, political oversight of the military’s autonomy in policy-
making, on the other hand, is intertwined with institutional/legal set-up of civil-
military relations. In parliamentary/prime ministerial European systems such as
Denmark, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK, the head of the state is not the same as
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the head of the government.27 While the head of the state is the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, “his/her authority is mostly symbolic in nature, and in practice
the head of the government is responsible to the parliament for defense of the country
and control of the armed forces.”28 Thus, in these systems, political oversight is rather
strong as the final decision-making power rests in the cabinet or the minister, the latter
being accountable to the parliament.29 In other words, the institutional set-up guaran-
tees the adequate political control of the military by empowering the civilians over the
office of the General Staff.
In presidential and semi-presidential European systems such as Bulgaria, Finland,
Poland and Romania, an elected President is the supreme commander, who super-
vises the Minister of Defense. In these countries, although the Chief of the General
Staff is legally responsible to the Minister of Defense, s/he has a more direct
access to the President than the Minister. According to Volten and Drent, a weak
coalition government or competition between the prime minister and the president
renders presidential and semi-presidential systems weaker than parliamentary
systems in terms of civil-military relations.30 Put differently, political oversight
of the military is at times a one-man job rather than a collective civilian task in
presidential and semi-presidential systems such as in France.
France is worth further examination since it is an outlier among many European
cases in terms of civil-military relations. In the French semi-presidential system,
the President is the ultimate decision-maker in important security and defense insti-
tutions such as the Defense and National Security Council. Moreover, co-habitation
has been especially problematic in France for formulating and implementing defense
policies. The CMR in France, in other words, has been traditionally conflict-ridden.
In contrast, a closer examination of the UK shows that the head of the state, the
Monarch, is the Commander in Chief; however, it is really the Monarch’s govern-
ment that plays an important role in defense policy-making. Institutionally, the
Prime Minister, as the head of the government, is the supreme decision-maker in
civil-military relations.31 The Chief of the General Staff has direct access to the
Prime Minister.32 It is true that on paper the Ministry of Defense, answerable to
both the Parliament and the Prime Minister, is the primary institution responsible
for the formulation and conduct of defense policies,33 and the General Staff is
responsible to the Minister of Defense. However, the Prime Minister and the
cabinet have close ties to the office of the General Staff, and it is for this reason
that the Prime Minister and his cabinet together are the final decision-makers in
important military matters.34 In the UK, both institutionally and politically, civilians
in different levels supervise the military.
The Turkish case with its parliamentary political system resembles both presiden-
tial and parliamentary systems in terms of its institutional/legal set-up of CMR. In
line with European parliamentary systems, Turkey’s head of the government
(Prime Minister) is distinct from the head of the state (President). The Turkish
General Staff has direct access to the Prime Minister and the President, through
formal and informal meetings35 or through the National Security Council (NSC)
meetings every other month. Following a common pattern with semi-presidential
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and presidential systems in Europe, according to Article 118 of the Constitution, “the
agenda of the National Security Council shall be drawn up by the President of the
Republic taking into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of
the General Staff.”
The President is the Commander in Chief, and has the authority to determine the
use of the armed forces and send troops abroad upon the approval of the parliament.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the situation in France, these powers are not actively used.
Unlike the French President, the President in Turkey has only an intermediary role in
civil-military relations; he mediates between the government and the military, i.e. in
the NSC meetings. On the other hand, the Turkish institutional set-up including the
NSC is similar to the new Defense and National Security Council established in
France in 2008 by the “French white paper on defense and national security.”36
Similarities between Turkish and European institutional/legal systems are numer-
ous due to Turkey’s aspirations for the EU membership; however, the major differ-
ence between the EU and Turkish institutional mechanisms is the structure of the
Ministry of National Defense. This is at the same time the most often pronounced
issue by the EU regarding the civil-military relations in that country.37 In Turkey,
the Minister of National Defense is responsible to the Prime Minister, and the
Office of the General Staff is not incorporated into the Ministry of Defense. While
the two cooperate as ruled by Law No. 1325 on the Duties and Organization of the
Ministry of National Defense, the Turkish Armed Forces is accountable directly to
the Prime Minister.38 This situation is rooted in the historical remnants of military
interventions. The General Staff was constitutionally and politically responsible to
the Ministry of National Defense before the 1960 military coup. Following the inter-
vention, the military argued that the Democrat Party governments (1950–1960) had
tried to manipulate the armed forces for political gains by using the Ministry of
National Defense. Thus, detaching the Office of the General Staff from the Ministry
of National Defense in 1961 and 1982 Constitutions transformed the organizational
structure of civil-military relations. The Minister of Defense came to have hardly any
political control over the Chief of the General Staff due to this institutional design.
The second issue that brings criticism to Turkish CMR is rather weak political
oversight of the military’s autonomy. Turkish politicians, until recently, have
mostly yielded to the military’s guardianship role. While demilitarization has been
an ongoing process for decades, civilianization of politics has been limited.39 One
aspect of political oversight is related to how much the parliament is involved in
defense policy-making. While especially the Dutch have been praised for their
very strict parliamentary control of defense policies, the Turkish parliament has not
been as active.
It should be noted here that the European practice is not uniform in this domain
either. For example, while political oversight of defense policy decisions is strict
in Germany, it clearly is not in France. The French parliament “will be informed
as he [President] wishes, [and] even if the people’s representative takes the trouble
of demanding direct involvement in the security policy,” the president may or may
not involve the parliament in the process.”40 Therefore, in terms of political oversight
Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East and Turkey 283
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of the military by the parliament, the Turkish system resembles the French but not the
German or Dutch systems, which are more transparent.
In sum, the main discrepancies between Turkey and the EU countries stems from
the absence of an integrated Defense Ministry where the General Staff is responsible
to the Minister of National Defense in addition to limited political control of defense
policy-making by civilian organs such as the parliament. While the former is still an
ongoing debate, on the latter issue some progress was made in recent years concern-
ing the control of the parliament over the military expenditures.41
While these two differences remain, as mentioned earlier, the Turkish system is
similar to the French in some ways and to the British and German in others. For
example, according to Klaus-Ju¨rgen Mu¨ller, in the past both French and German mili-
taries have at times intervened in politics as the Turkish military did, since those
armed forces had also regarded themselves as the savior of the nation and the
state.42 Moreover, both French and German militaries, like their Turkish counterpart,
compromised their reputations by getting drawn into politics by the civilians43 until a
common democratic practice in Europe has become the norm, especially after the
1990s. Likewise, despite its differences, with the help of institutional and political
changes undertaken for EU accession, Turkish civil-military relations may further
converge with the Western European model in the years to come.
Central and Eastern European versus Turkish Civil-Military Relations
The Central and East European (CEE) countries have generally followed a different
course than the Western civil-military relations due to their communist heritage.
According to Stefan Sarvas, the post-communist CEE governments legitimated them-
selves using the “constitutional framework, political supervision and public’s accep-
tance.”44 In his 1999 article, Sarvas argues that democratization had been under way
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia,
although the military was often involved in politics.45 In those states that had a stricter
communist legacy where the military’s major role was to support the Party in main-
taining the Communist regime (i.e. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania), the mili-
tary was an ordinary actor in politics.46 Once the Cold War came to an end, although
institutional mechanisms changed and the military has become legally separated from
politics through banning of military officers from participating in political parties,
political oversight of the military in post-communist CEE countries has been a key
challenge. Sarvas emphasizes the effect of the NATO expansion as a vehicle for
increasing democratic control in post-communist countries at the end of the 1990s.47
Jones and Mychajlyszyn also point to the effect of NATO on the democratization
of civil-military relations as an actor that pushes for both institutional and political
reforms in post-communist states.48 While Serbia and Croatia are assessed as
countries with weak civilian control, the Russian Federation is under the heavy
control of Putin; thus, the military is still the defender of the regime/party. In
these countries, the Minister of Defense is generally not a civilian, and except for
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Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, political oversight of the military by
civilians is insubstantial.49
Once again parliamentary versus semi-presidential and presidential institutional
design makes a difference for political oversight of the military. According to
Zoltan Barany, in parliamentary systems such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, a stable and balanced civilian control of the military was quite successful
since the power of the President was only symbolic.50 However, in presidential
systems such as Romania and Poland, the chief executive was very powerful, and
in both cases the presidential system was established to strengthen the hands of the
old elite.51 Thus, in Romania and Poland, the parliament was in a weaker status
vis-a`-vis the military. These choices of institutional/legal mechanisms, in turn,
affected civilian control of the military and the armed forces’ domestic political
role in the CEE civil-military relations.52
The Turkish case is different from the CEE civil-military relations. The legacy of
communism and the strong Communist Party tradition have led to either professional
or politicized militaries in the CEE states. Some CEE countries transformed into more
liberal and democratic states while others were hardly depoliticized and the militaries
such as the Romanian armed forces have often been used for domestic situations.53
Despite these dissimilarities, Turkish and CEE civil-military relations share one
focal common trait: the impetus of external factors for democratization. What the
EU has so far accomplished in terms of Turkey’s democratic consolidation has
been matched by first the effect of NATO on civil-military relations of CEE countries
and later by the EU enlargement process through which some of the CEE countries
were integrated in the EU, in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Starting from very
different backgrounds due to historical and institutional legacies, these cases have
converged in a process of political oversight of the military because of their drive
for being a part of Western institutions such as NATO and the EU.
Middle Eastern versus Turkish Civil-Military Relations54
Although militaries in the Middle East are strongly connected to the political regimes
of their states, there is still limited recent work on Middle Eastern civil-military
relations.55 Majid Khadduri’s seminal work on the Middle East published in 1953
refers to an Islamist ideologist, Sayyid Jamal al Din, who once argued that only a dic-
tator can rule in the Middle East.56 In contrast, Khadduri posits that Kemal Atatu¨rk
left behind his military duties and set up a parliamentary system of government
while his contemporaries in the Middle East failed to achieve similar progress.57
This was due to “an almost nostalgic longing in the Middle East, common to all
political groups, for a strong regime which will tolerate neither multiplicity of
political parties nor anarchy of ideas.”58 Thus, the civilians and the military in that
region did not have trust for democracy, which was “transplanted into a social
milieu unprepared for it.”59 Thus, the institutional/legal mechanisms in the Middle
East were based either on an Islamic religious order (Sharia), or on personal dictator-
ships and monarchies.
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In contrast, after the proclamation of the new Republic in 1923, the Turkish mili-
tary was a strong believer in Westernization, this was also the ultimate goal of the
Kemalist Turkish Armed Forces. In other words, while modernization was a
foreign concept to most Middle Eastern states after the end of the colonization era,
the Turkish military pioneered modernization in Turkey ever since the last decades
of the Ottoman Empire.60 As a result, the Turkish political regime became first a par-
liamentary system (1923) and later a multi-party system (1945). In other words, the
Turkish legal/institutional set-up was significantly different from its Middle Eastern
counterparts.
Another difference in this early period between the Turkish case and Middle
Eastern CMR is that the latter’s coup d’e´tats were mostly a result of losing wars,
hence punishing politicians for their incompetence at war times,61 while the former
intervened to topple governments, which either had authoritarian tendencies or
were unable to curb the violence on the streets. Since the modern Turkish military
has never lost a war, it has constructed a national identity on the bravery of the
Turkish nation. Moreover, while the military in Middle Eastern states was a
stepping-stone for high governmental office, this was not the case for the Turkish mili-
tary in the early Republican era.62 Upon Atatu¨rk’s direction, the 1924 Constitution
ruled that officers resigned before they could get involved in politics.63 Almost two
decades later, in James Bill’s 1969 comparison of Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria,
Middle Eastern armies were deemed “continually rent by internal cleavage and con-
flict.”64 In contrast, Turkeywas shown as having a cohesivemilitary, which is different
from the others for its long-term modernizing role. In Bill’s four other cases, militaries
switched roles from coup to coup, from a “modernizing” role to “protecting the status
quo.” Iraq, for example, experienced seven coups in five years (1936–41).65
Several decades after James Bill’s analysis, Mehran Kamrava has argued that the
Huntingtonian military professionalism66 has seldom led to political civilianization in
the Middle East. Instead, it often triggered military interventions.67 Accordingly, the
political role of the military follows a similar pattern in all Middle Eastern countries.
However, Kamrava highlights the concept of democratization so that Turkey is com-
pared to Israel while Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen are compared
to one another. According to Kamrava, except for Israel and Turkey, the role of the
military in all Middle Eastern and North African states is overt. Kamrava’s argument
implies that the democratic regime structure adopted in Turkey increases the political
oversight of the military’s autonomy while the same is not possible in authoritarian
institutional/legal systems of Middle Eastern countries.
In a similar vein, David Sorenson compares Algeria to other North African
countries and conceptually distinguishes between military as “another player” and
as “a dominating actor.” In Turkey the military is “another player” while in
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya the military is “a dominating actor.”68 Along
the same lines, in Kamrava’s study, Israel and Turkey are included as “ostensibly
democratic states,” Iran, Iraq and Libya as inclusionary states with militaries kept
in check by volunteer militias, and Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia and
Yemen as exclusionary states where non-ideological civilian autocrats rule.
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Finally, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Saudi Arabia are illustrated as countries where
tribal loyalty is used to counterbalance the political and economic autonomy of the
military.69
The final important difference between the Turkish military and Middle Eastern
militaries is the presence of multiple military branches in the latter.70 Although
there are recent differences of opinion within the Turkish military, compared to its
Middle Eastern counterparts, the Turkish Armed Forces has been quite cohesive.
The interventions after 1960 have not significantly altered the chain of command
in Turkey, while, for example, in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps estab-
lished by direct order from Khomeini in May 1979 coexists with the Basij militia,
which was formed to suppress anti-revolutionaries in 1979.71
While there are overwhelming differences between Middle Eastern civil-military
relations and the Turkish case, only a most suspicious eye can find a similarity
between Turkish and Middle Eastern civil-military cases. One such similarity can
be the nature of threats that the military perceives in the internal political scene.
While the Turkish military has been wary of Kurdish separatism and Islamist funda-
mentalism, Algeria, for example, has had similar concerns about religious fundament-
alism.72 These perceptions of threat at times led to interventions in both Turkey and
Middle Eastern countries. Thus, despite institutional differences, certain military per-
ceptions on what constitutes a threat to the regime have led to the similar consequence
of overt military interventions in both cases. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say
that the Middle Eastern civil-military relations paradigm has more differences than
similarities with Turkish CMR in terms of the two criteria used in this article to
compare cases—institutional/legal mechanisms and political oversight of the
military’s autonomy.
Conclusion: Turkish Civil-Military Relations in between Paradigms?
Institutional/legal mechanisms in Turkey are closer to European civil-military
relations models than the Middle Eastern (and North African) CMR paradigm.
According to Linz and Stepan, “democratic transition is complete when a government
elected by free and popular vote has the authority to make policies and all parties
accept the democratic nature of the regime.”73 Consolidation, on the other hand,
emerges behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally when all actors in the
political regime genuinely accept democracy as the best form of government.
Accordingly, the conceptualization of democratization as a process situates the
Turkish case closer to the categories of Western European advanced democracies
and Central and Eastern European developing democracies, and further from the
Middle Eastern civil-military relations category.
Institutional/legal mechanisms are dynamic and civil-military relations transform
over time. The Turkish case indicates that constitutional and attitudinal dimensions of
democratization have been long under way and Turkey has been struggling through
behavioral change in trying to fully civilianize its civil-military relations.74 In con-
trast, the role of the military in Middle Eastern countries has been relatively static
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and mostly against modernization attempts75 while the Turkish military has been
transforming due to several factors, including the changes in military mindset76
and the impact of the European Union.77
In terms of political oversight of the military, the Turkish case has been gradually
transforming in conjunction with institutional/legal reforms. The Turkish military is
less out-spoken and increasingly realizes that it is subordinate to civilian authorities.78
The civilians are now less submissive to military direction of politics and parliamen-
tarians are relatively more interested in defense policy-making and in controlling the
defense budget. Parallel to recent debates on its role, the military seems to be cau-
tiously retreating from the political domain. In fact, the 2010 EU progress report
has pointed to positive developments in Turkish CMR.79 While civil-military
relations transform in the country, it is yet unclear whether Turkish democracy is
sufficiently civilianized to complete democratic consolidation.
In sum, the juxtaposition of Turkish, Western and Central and Eastern European
and Middle Eastern civil-military relations paradigms shows that the Turkish case
draws parallels to the European paradigm more than the Middle Eastern model.
Differences between European and Turkish civil-military relations will, to a great
extent, be curbed when/if an integrated Ministry of Defense is established and as
civilians further increase the political oversight of the military. There is little doubt
that a complete convergence with the European civil-military relations paradigm is
the key to Turkey’s bid for EU membership.
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